Campaign Promises and Political Factions by Panova, Elena
      
Panova: CIRANO, CIRPÉE and Département des sciences économiques, Université du Québec à Montréal, C.P. 
8888, Succursale Centre-Ville, Montréal (Québec) Canada H3C 3P8 
panova.elena@uqam.ca 
 
I am grateful to Attila Ambrus, Francis Bloch, Stephen Coate, Bernard Fortin, Stefan Krasa, Andrea Mattozzi, 
Michael Peters, Jean Tirole, seminar participants at New Economic School, Université de Montréal, Université 
du Québec à Montréal, and especially to Nicolas Marceau for helpful comments. CIRPÉE provided financial 
support. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Cahier de recherche/Working Paper 08-01 
 
 
 
 
 
Campaign Promises and Political Factions 
 
 
Elena Panova 
 
 
 
 
 
Janvier/January 2008 
Abstract:  
This paper builds a dynamic model of electoral competition with nonbinding 
campaign promises. We find that campaign promises by a candidate for office signal 
her political preferences and public policy that she intends to implement. The reason 
is that electoral competition induces her to pander campaign promises to political 
interests by a minimal majority of citizens. If their votes bring her in office, she has to 
raise them once again in order to be re-elected. For that, she needs to fulfill her 
electoral promises. To minimize the cost of pandering to re-election if in office, a 
candidate gives campaign promises that she would like to fulfill the most. She fulfills 
them if in office, unless the cost of fulfillment lies above the benefit from re-election. 
We show, furthermore, that representatives by a minimal majority of citizens form a 
faction to coordinate their electoral strategies, and we investigate the consequences 
of such political collusion. 
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1 Introduction
In electoral campaigns, candidates competing for office describe public pol-
icy which they intend to implement, presumably in order to increase their
electoral fortunes. Winners seem to keep their word most of the time. Royed
and Borrelli (1997) find that between 1977 and 1992, most of 287 platform
pledges on social welfare policy by two major US parties were fulfilled. Budge,
Robertson, and Hearl (1987) and Petry (1995) find campaign promise fulfill-
ment in other democracies. This paper builds a model of electoral competi-
tion with nonbinding, yet informative campaign promises.
Model outline The citizens are differentiated by type of preferences
over pork-barrel policy: pork to citizens of one type imposes a cost on the
citizens of the other types.1 For simplicity, there are three types. A citizen’s
type is his private information. An arbitrary small mass of citizens becomes
informed about the cost of a pork: these citizens are the politicians; the
other citizens are the voters. All types are equally represented both among
the politicians and among the voters: this information is public.
There are two majority vote elections. Two politicians compete for office
in either election: the winner picks pork-barrel policy. The first election is
an open-seat race. The second election is an incumbent-challenger race. In
the first election, a candidate for office gives campaign promises regarding
pork-barrel policy if she is in office: she is free to break her word. In the
second election, citizen beliefs about the incumbent’s type depend both on
her electoral promises and on her policy.2
Informative campaign promises We solve the game using perfect
Bayesian equilibrium concept. We restrict out attention to symmetric pure
strategy equilibria. Proposition 1 describes equilibria with informative elec-
toral promises, that is, equilibria in which a candidate’s campaign promises
signal her type.3
1We follow the political science tradition of using “pork” for favorable public policy.
2Nothing changes if the incumbent and the challenger give electoral promises: either-
way, the winner of the second election picks her most preferred policy in the last period.
3For the sake of completeness, Section A.1 describes “babbling” equilibria.
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Because of electoral competition, a candidate for office in the first election
panders campaign promises to a minimal majority of citizens.4 If their votes
bring her in office, she needs to raise them once again if she wants to be
re-elected. For that, she has to fulfill her electoral promises.5 To minimize
the cost of pandering to re-election if in office, a candidate gives promises
that she would like to fulfill the most. She fulfills them if in office, unless
the cost of fulfillment lies above the benefit from keeping control over public
policy for one more term.
Hence, a candidate’s campaign promises signal her type and pork-barrel
policy if she is in office. However, they decrease the efficiency of pork-barrel
policy by limiting the incumbent’s flexibility in pandering to re-election.
Political collusion Because campaign promises are fulfilled at a pos-
itive rate, representatives by a minimal majority of citizens would like to
agree on campaign advertising strategy if running for office. We extend the
model with a bargaining stage in which one type politicians and a minimal
majority of some other type politicians form a political faction.
At the beginning of the game: the Nature sequentially draws a politi-
cian; she receives the other politicians’ private messages about their types:
these messages may be either true or false; she offers political faction mem-
bership to a subset of politicians; a receiver of the offer either accepts or
rejects it. The faction is formed if and only if any receiver accepts the offer.
Bargaining goes until a political faction is formed. Both composition of the
faction and a politician’s membership in the faction become public informa-
tion. For simplicity, we assume that a member of the faction competes with
an independent candidate in either election.6 Furthermore, the incumbent
can abstain from re-election.
We continue to focus on equilibria with informative campaign promises.
4Because the candidates pander campaign promises to citizen beliefs, a variety of
promises can be sustained in equilibrium. However, in any equilibrium, campaign promises
signal the same information to the voters, and they have the same effects on elections and
policies. We are interested in these effects, and not in the contents of electoral pledges.
5By abuse of terminology, we say that the incumbent fulfills her campaign promises if
and only if both her promises and her policy pander to the same citizens.
6Our insights remain qualitatively robust if this assumption is canceled.
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Proposition 2 describes equilibria in which a politician who is drawn to make
an offer learns the other politicians’ types from their messages.7 The politi-
cian who is drawn to make an offer first maximizes the probability of event
that the incumbent is congruent with her subject to acceptance of her offer
by any receiver. She offers faction membership to her type politicians and to
a minimal majority of some other type politicians, this offer is accepted by
all receivers, and the faction is formed.
A candidate from the faction in the first election panders campaign promises
to citizens whose types are represented in the faction, and she wins office by
their votes. In office, she either (i) fulfills her campaign promises, runs for
re-election and wins it; or else she (ii) picks her most preferred policy and
abstains from re-election, so as to increase the coherence of the vote by cit-
izens whose types are represented in her faction, and to guarantee thereby
that the winner of the second election is a member of the faction.
Consequences of political collusion Political faction formation bi-
ases pork-barrel policy towards political interests that are represented in the
faction. More importantly, it decreases the efficiency of pork-barrel policy,
because it dilutes the incumbent’s re-election concerns.8
To emphasize this effect, we further extend the game so as to reinforce
re-election pressures. Indeed, we increase voter information in the second
election: after observing the incumbent’s policy, a politician votes either
“for” or “against” the incumbent’s nomination for re-election; the incumbent
is nominated if and only if she raises a majority of the votes; the outcome is
public information.
We consider, one-by-one two institutional environments: (i) political fac-
tion formation is banned; (ii) it is feasible. In either environment, we describe
the most efficient equilibrium with informative electoral promises. In such an
equilibrium, nomination for re-election (or its failure) signals a politician’s
preference between the incumbent and the challenger: recall that nomination
7Democratic outcomes in equilibria with uninformative communication among the
politicians are described by Proposition 1.
8If the incumbent deviates to her most preferred policy, the winner of the second
election belongs to the incumbent’s faction, hence, she is congruent with the incumbent
with a high probability.
4
rule is a majority vote, and only a minimal majority of politicians are on the
incumbent’s board. As a result, in the second election a voter votes in the
same way as a politician of his type. Hence, the incumbent is re-elected if
and only if her policy does not reveal her type to the politicians. Therefore,
she picks: either (i) her most preferred policy; or else (ii) the most efficient
policy that any politician on her board would implement under threat of no
re-election. Propositions 3 and 4 show that the incumbent’s policy is more
efficient when political faction formation is banned.
According to this insight, political parties play a controversial role in
democratic process. On the one hand, they establish organizations to select
high-quality candidates for office and increase their commitment abilities.9
On the other hand, however, a party is a political faction that helps its
members to coordinate their electoral strategies. Indeed, voters show loyalty
to political parties in elections;10 and political representatives affiliated to
the same party demonstrate high legislative cohesiveness.11
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 reviews related literature.
Section 3 formalizes basic model. Section 4 describes democratic outcomes
with informative electoral promises. Section 5 describes political faction for-
mation. Section 6 investigates its consequences. Section 7 concludes.
2 Related literature
Informative campaign promises While a sizable literate assumes
that electoral promises are binding, some papers predict that they are fulfilled
without making this assumption. Austen-Smith and Banks (1989) build
9Section 2 reviews the literature that emphasizes commitment and signalling benefits
from political parties.
10From 1953 to 2004, 88% of respondents of Biannual poll by American National Elec-
tion Studies associated themselves with one of the major parties; moreover, 83% of Demo-
cratic identifiers voted Democratic, and 79% of Republican identifiers voted Republican
in Congressional elections.
11On average, in roll-call votes from 1857 to 2000more than 83% of House representatives
with the same party affiliation voted in the same way; and in about 60% of votes a majority
of Democrats opposed a majority of Republicans (Gershtenson, 2006). Note that in this
period only 0.3% of House representatives were independent.
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political agency model with moral hazard. The incumbent’s performance
depends on her effort. During electoral campaign, the candidates for office
describe their performance goals. The voters put re-election pressures on the
incumbent by using a scoring rule that compares her performance to her
electoral promises. Thereby, they encourage the incumbent to exert an effort
in fulfillment of electoral promises.
In an infinite-horizon model by Aragones, Palfrey, and Postlewaite (2006)
politicians keep their campaign promises in order to build reputation with
voters who play trigger strategies.
In Harrington (1993), the candidates for office pander electoral promises
to voter beliefs. There are two majority vote elections with two candidates
competing in either election. The winner chooses between two public policies.
One of the policies is efficient, that is, it generates the highest expected payoff
to the voters. Neither the voters nor the candidates know which policy is
efficient. The players are divided in two types by their prior beliefs on this
issue: players of the same type are biased towards the same policy. The
voters are Bayesian. The candidates remain steadfast in their prior beliefs.
A player’s type is his private information. Electoral weight by either type is
uncertain. In the first election, a candidate tells which policy she intends to
choose. The incumbent chooses either policy. The voters see both her choice
and their payoff, and they update beliefs about the effectiveness of different
policies and the incumbent’s type. In the second election, the incumbent
competes with the challenger whose type is drawn at random.
Because the last period office-holder picks the policy that is efficient by her
(prior) beliefs, in the second election a voter votes for the candidate whose
beliefs are the most likely to be “correct”. The incumbent panders to re-
election by choosing a policy that she believes to be efficient. When expected
electoral weight by either type voters is sufficiently high, a candidate for office
in the first election truthfully tells which policy she intends to choose.
Our emphasis is different both from Austen-Smith and Banks (in our
model, the voters compare the incumbent’s policy to her electoral promises
in order to update their beliefs about her political preferences), and from
Aragones, Palfrey, and Postlewaite (in our model the voters do not use trig-
ger strategies). It is reminiscent of Harrington in that the candidates for
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office pander campaign promises to voter beliefs. However, in our model the
incumbent’s policy choice is not pre-determined: she either picks her most
preferred policy or else she panders to re-election, depending on the cost of
pork-barrel pandering. This relates out paper to a sizable literature that
studies strategic behavior by politicians with re-election concerns. Indeed,
our framework is based on Maskin and Tirole (2001): see section “Tyranny
of the minorities: pork-barrel pandering”.12
Commitment and signaling benefits from political parties A
growing body of papers views political parties as organizations that enhance
their members’ electoral fortunes by generating public signal on their political
preferences, or else by increasing their commitment abilities.
In Snyder and Ting (2002), Ashworth and Bueno de Mesquita (2006), and
Castanheira and Crutzen (2006) a candidate’s party affiliation is a costly sig-
nal of her ideology in a unidimensional spectrum. In Snyder and Ting, the
voters have preferences over an office holder’s ideology. Parties are unitary
players that locate their platforms so as to maximize the votes raised by
their candidates for office. A candidate can join a party at a cost which is
increasing in the distance between her ideology and the party’s platform.
Party membership is informative, because a party attracts the members
whose ideologies lie sufficiently close to its platform. In Ashworth and Bueno
de Mesquita, a party sets the cost of its membership. In Castanheira and
Crutzen, it indicates a set of tolerated policies around some point in ideolog-
ical spectrum.
In Levy (2004) and in Morelli (2004) intra-party ideological heterogeneity
increases commitment abilities by the party’s candidate for office. In Levy, a
candidate for office can commit to implement a policy that lies in Pareto set
by the party members. In Morelli, she can commit to a diverse set of policies
that internalize ideologies represented in the party.
Our insights imply that commitment and signalling benefits from party
membership shall be attributed to party organization. This idea is empha-
sized in the literature. In Alesina and Spear (1988) partisanship increases
12This section is not included in the final version of their paper.
7
commitment abilities by a candidate for office, because a party has an infinite
horizon unlike its members.
In Caillaud and Tirole (2002); and in Castanheira, Crutzen and Sahuguet
(2005), party nomination signals high quality of electoral platform by the
nominee. Caillaud and Tirole consider party organization composed of (i)
like-minded candidates for office who design electoral platforms; and (ii)
rank-and-file who organize intra-party competition among the candidates,
so as to maximize the probability of the event that the party’s nominee
wins the general election. This probability is increasing in quality of the
nominee’s electoral platform. Therefore, the party organization: (i) on the
one hand, encourages the candidates to exert effort in platform design; (ii) on
the other hand, discourages them from challenging high quality platforms by
their party members. Castanheira, Crutzen and Sahuguet consider a duopoly
party structure. They investigate how the incentives by partizan candidates
are influenced by interaction of inter- and intra-party competition.
3 Basic model
Consider a two-period model of representative democracy.13 The citizens are
differentiated by type of preferences over public policy. A citizen’s type θ is
his private information. There are three types θ ∈ {1, 2, 3}.14 In a period,
type θ citizens either receive pork or not, as indicated by variable15
pθ =
{
1, if type θ citizens receive pork;
0, otherwise.
Set P = {(p1, p2, p3) | pθ ∈ {0, 1}} is pork-barrel policy space. Pork to type
θ citizens delivers them benefit b, and it imposes cost 1+xθ∆
2
on either type
θ˜ = θ citizens, where variable xθ is drawn independently between the periods
13Timing of the game is summarized at the end of this section.
14It is straightforward to extend the model to an arbitrary number of types. Also, we
believe that our insights remain robust if the model is extended to more periods.
15For notational convenience, here and everywhere below we omit a period indicator for
period-specific variables, like pθ.
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and among the types from diffused Bernoulli distribution:
xθ =
{
1, with probability 1
2
;
0, with probability 1
2
.
We denote with
Vθ(p) = pθb−
1
2
∑
θ˜ =θ
p
θ˜
(
1 + x
θ˜
∆
)
(1)
type θ citizen payoff from pork-barrel policy p = (p1, p2, p3) ∈ P.16 Inequali-
ties
1 < b < 1 + ∆ (2)
guarantee that pork to type θ citizens is efficient if and only if xθ = 0. Hence,
parameter ∆ measures the cost of inefficient pork-barrel policy.
Only an arbitrary small mass of the citizens, called the politicians, learns
period-specific state x = (x1, x2, x3). The other citizens, called the voters,
remain uninformed about the state. Any type is equally represented both
among the politicians and among the voters: this information is public. At
the beginning of either period there is an election, in which two politicians
compete for office by a simple majority-vote without abstention.17 The win-
ner picks pork-barrel policy in the period.
The candidates for office in the first election are drawn at random. We
index a candidate with k; variable θk denotes type by candidate k; index −k
refers to the rival by candidate k; index I refers to the first-period incumbent,
called by abuse of terminology the incumbent. The candidates simultaneously
give public campaign promises. That is, for each possible state x, candidate
k describes policy pk(x, θk) = (pk1(x, θ
k), pk2(x, θ
k), pk3(x, θ
k)) from set P which
she intends to pick if in office: she is free to break her word. Depending on
campaign promises, the citizens update their beliefs about a candidate’s type
and pork-barrel policy if she wins the first election. It is convenient to say
that
16Note that two different type citizens would like to deliver no pork to each other.
However, they both wish that no pork is given to yet different type citizens. As an
illustration, imagine that one type citizens would like to increase worker compensation;
the second type citizens would like to increase family assistance; and the third type citizens
would like to decrease income tax rate.
17Note that vote by the politicians is not influential.
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Definition 1 (electoral base) type θ citizen is in electoral base by candi-
date k if and only if Pr
(
θk = θ | pk(x, θk), p−k(x, θ−k)
)
> 0. Set
Bk(θk) =
{
θ | Pr
(
θk = θ | pk(x, θk), p−k(x, θ−k)
)
> 0
}
(3)
is the types in electoral base by candidate k.
The incumbent picks policy p(x, θI) = (p1(x, θ
I), p2(x, θ
I), p3(x, θ
I)) from
set P.18 A politician observes the entire vector p(x, θI). A voter sees only
his type-specific component, that is, type θ voter sees pθ(x, θ
I). The citizens
update their beliefs about the incumbent’s type. In the second election, the
incumbent competes with a politician drawn at random: “the challenger”.
Timing of the game
Date 0.
The Nature draws the candidates for office. The candidates give campaign
promises. The citizens update their beliefs about a candidate’s type and
pork-barrel policy if she is in office.
Date 1. The first election.
a. The Nature draws the first-period state. The politicians learn the state.
b. The incumbent picks pork-barrel policy. A politician sees the policy. A
voter sees only whether or not he has received pork. The citizens update
their beliefs about the incumbent’s type.
c. The Nature draws the challenger.
Date 2. The second election.
a. The Nature draws the second-period state.
b. The politician in office learns the state and picks pork-barrel policy.
Tie-breaking assumptions
(T1) When a candidate is indifferent between two campaign advertising strate-
gies, she plays either strategy with probability 1
2
.
(T2) Being indifferent between the candidates, a citizen votes at random.
18The first-period policy depends on three arguments: x, θI , and pI(x, θI). For nota-
tional convenience, we write it as a function of arguments x and θI .
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(T3) When the vote results in a tie, the election’s outcome is random.
(T4) An office-holder receives arbitrary small perks from office.19
4 Informative electoral promises
We solve the game using perfect Bayesian equilibrium concept. We focus on
symmetric equilibria in which the players use pure-strategies, unless specified
otherwise by a tie-breaking assumption. “Babbling” equilibria in which a
candidate’s campaign promises do not depend on her type are described in
Section A.1. This section describes the complementary set of equilibria. For
concreteness,20 let us focus on equilibria in which candidate k promises at
least as high expected payoff to type θk citizens as to anybody else, so that
Pr
(
θk = θ | EVθ
(
pk(x, θk)
)
< max
θ˜ =θ
{
EV
θ˜
(
pk(x, θk)
)})
= 0, (4)
where the expectations are taken at date 1. By abuse of terminology,
Definition 2 (informative electoral promises) campaign promises are
informative if and only if citizen beliefs are described by equation (4).
Because the incumbent is congruent with type θI citizens, type θ citizen
maximizes the probability of event θI = θ (Lemma A.6). To this goal: (i)
at date 1, a citizen votes for the candidate who is the most likely to be
congruent with him (Lemma A.7); and (ii) at date 0, a candidate panders her
campaign promises to citizen beliefs, so as to maximize her electoral fortunes.
Competition for office encourages her to promise the same expected payoff
to citizens of two types, and a lower expected payoff to the remaining type
citizens, so as to frame a minimal majority of citizens in her electoral base
(Lemma A.8). The outcome of the first election is random.
In the second election, once again, a voter would like to elect a politician
who is congruent with him, because the last period office-holder delivers pork
only to her type citizens. A voter outside the incumbent’s electoral base votes
for the challenger, because he remembers the incumbent’s electoral promises.
19Hence, when the cost of pandering to re-election is equal to the benefit from staying
in office, the incumbent panders to re-election.
20Recall footnote 4.
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A voter in the incumbent’s electoral base votes for re-election if and only if
he receives pork, because the incumbent’s policy signals her type (Lemma
A.9). Hence, the incumbent stays in office if and only if she gives pork to
anybody in her electoral base.
On the one hand, the incumbent would like to stay in office, so as to keep
control over pork-barrel policy. On the other hand, however, she would like
to give pork only to type θI citizens. When they are in her electoral base,
the cost of re-election is the lowest. Because the incumbent has played an
optimal campaign advertising strategy, her electoral base is type θI citizens
and some other type citizens. Naturally, the incumbent gives pork to her
type citizens regardless of its cost, that is,
pθI (x, θ
I) = 1 for any x. (5)
She gives pork to type BI(θI)\
{
θI
}
citizens if and only if the cost that is
paid by type θI citizens for this pork lies not higher than the expected benefit
from pandering to re-election21
R =
2b
3
+
1
3
+
∆
6
. (6)
When the cost of inefficient pork-barrel pandering ∆ lies not higher than
threshold 2b − 1
2
, type BI(θI)\
{
θI
}
citizens receive pork regardless of its
cost, that is,
pBI(θI )\{θI}(x, θ
I) = 1 for any x. (7)
Otherwise, they receive pork if and only if it is efficient, that is,22
pBI(θI)\{θI}(x, θ
I) = 1− xBI(θI )\{θI}. (8)
The citizens outside the incumbent’s electoral base never gives pork:
p{1,2,3}\BI(θI)(x, θ
I) = 0 for any x, (9)
because is costly for the incumbent and it does not bring them on her board
in the second election.
21The incumbent’s expected second-period payoff is equal to b if she stays in office; and
to b
3
− 2
3
(
1
2
+ ∆
4
)
if the challenger wins the second election.
22Hence, the incumbent internalizes the cost of pork to some citizens. This is a benefit
from political agency.
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Proposition 1 (informative campaign promises) In an equilibrium with
informative electoral promises set Bk(θk) has two elements: θk and a random
draw from set {1, 2, 3} \
{
θk
}
. Either candidate wins the first election with
probability 1
2
. The first-period policy is described by set of equations (5),
(9) and: either (7), when ∆  2b − 1
2
; or (8) otherwise. The incumbent is
re-elected unless both ∆ > 2b − 1
2
and xBI (θI)\{θI} = 1. The second-period
office-holder gives pork only to her type citizens.23
Proposition 1 implies that a candidate’s campaign promises increase voter
information about her type and pork-barrel policy that she intends to imple-
ment. For instance, when a candidate promises pork in any state to anybody
in her electoral base, and no pork ever to anybody outside her electoral base,
she keeps her word in most states if in office.
The flip side of the coin, is that campaign promises decrease the effi-
ciency of the first-period policy, because they limit the incumbent’s oppor-
tunities to pander to re-election: compare the first-period policy described
by Proposition 1 and that described by Lemmas A.3 and A.4. Because in
our model electoral sorting is irrelevant from social welfare perspective, cam-
paign promises decrease the welfare. This insight may change of the model is
extended in such a way that campaign promises signal a candidate’s quality.
5 Political collusion
This section extends the model to investigate the issue of political collusion.
Before the candidates for office are drawn, the politicians bargain about mem-
bership in political faction. The sequence of events is the following.
0.a. The Nature randomly draws a politician called political leader.
0.b. The leader receives the other politicians’ private messages about their
types: a message may be either true or false.
0.c. The leader offers political faction membership to a subset of politicians.
Share sθ of type θ politicians in the subset becomes public information.
23By assumption (T1), and Lemmas A.8 and A.10, set Bk(θk) has two possible real-
izations. For any given sets Bk(θk) and B−k(θ−k) democratic outcomes are described
unambiguously. This remark applies to all Propositions below.
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0.d. A receiver of the offer either accepts or rejects it. The faction is formed
if and only if the offer is accepted by any receiver. If it is formed, the game
continues as of date 0.a. Otherwise, it goes back to date 0.a.
For simplicity, we assume that in either election a member of political faction
competes with an independent candidate.24 Furthermore, we assume that the
incumbent can abstain from re-election.
Additional tie-breaking assumptions
(T5) When political leader is indifferent between two offers, she makes either
offer with probability 1
2
.
(T6) A politician has arbitrary weak preference to remain independent.
We continue to consider equilibria with informative electoral promises.
This section considers equilibria with political collusion in which a politician’s
message to a leader signals her type.25 We look at a stationary faction
membership offer that is not rejected by anybody. The political leader who
is drawn first offers faction membership so as to maximizes the probability
of event that the incumbent is of her type subject to her offer being accepted
by any receiver. She offers membership to: (i) all politicians of her type; and
(ii) a minimal majority of some other type politicians; any receiver of the
offer accepts it; and the faction is formed. Note that when a politician sends
a message about her type to the leader she does not want to cheat: in this
stage, her beliefs about types by politicians who will be invited in the faction
are diffused.
The candidate from the faction in the first election frames her electoral
base out of the citizens whose types are represented in the faction, and she
wins office by their votes. In office, she either (i) gives pork to all of them,
runs for re-election and wins it; or else (ii) she picks her most preferred
policy and abstains from re-election.26 Her expected benefit from pandering
24Recall footnote 6.
25Propositions 1 and 2 give a complete description of democratic outcomes in an equi-
librium with informative electoral promises.
26If the second election is an open-seat, the winner is in the incumbent’s faction. She is
congruent with the incumbent with probability higher than 1
2
.
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to re-election is equal to
r =
b
2
+
1
4
+
∆
8
. (10)
Therefore, she panders to re-election in any state if and only if ∆  4b−2
3
;
otherwise, her policy is described by equations (5) and (8).
Proposition 2 (political collusion) In an equilibrium with informative elec-
toral promises and political collusion the political leader who is drawn first
assembles political faction out of all politicians of her type and a minimal ma-
jority of some other type politicians. The candidate from the faction frames
electoral base out of the citizens whose types are represented in the faction,
and she wins the first election. The first-period policy is described by set of
equations (5), (9) and: (7) when ∆  4b−2
3
, (8) when ∆ > 4b−2
3
. The in-
cumbent is re-elected unless both ∆ > 4b−2
3
and xBI (θI)\{θI} = 1. The second-
period office-holder is a member the faction. She gives pork only to her type
citizens.
Hence, when the candidates communicate, they from political faction to
coordinate their electoral strategies.
6 Consequences of political collusion
Proposition 2 shows that political faction formation biases pork-barrel pol-
icy towards the citizens whose types are represented in the faction. More
importantly, it erodes the efficiency of the first-period policy, because it de-
creases the incumbent’s re-election concerns: compare the right-hand-sides
of equations (10) and (6).
To emphasize this effect, we extend the game so as to reinforce re-election
pressures. Indeed, we increase voter information in the second election. Sup-
pose that between date 1.c and date 2, a politician votes either “for” or
“against” the incumbent’s nomination for re-election. The incumbent re-
ceives nomination if and only if a majority of politicians votes for it. Variable
e =
{
1, if the incumbent is nominated for re-election;
0, otherwise
15
indicates the outcome. It is public information.
We consider, one-by-one two institutional environments: (i) political fac-
tion formation is banned; (ii) it is feasible. We compare the most efficient
equilibria with informative electoral promises. Because democratic outcomes
in equilibria in which a politician’s vote regarding nomination for re-election
does not depend on her preference between the incumbent and the challenger
are already described by Propositions 1 and 2, we now focus on the comple-
mentary set of equilibria with informative electoral promises (we will see that
the most efficient equilibria lie in this set). For concreteness,27 let a politician
vote for the incumbent’s nomination if and only if she is for re-election, that
is, if and only if
Pr
(
θI = θ | p(x, θI), pI(x, θI), x
)
>
1
3
. (11)
The upper limits of efficiency In our model, efficiency of an equilib-
rium is measured by efficiency of the first-period policy in this equilibrium.
Because the citizens outside the incumbent’s electoral base never receive
pork, the first-period policy cannot be more efficient than pork-barrel policy
that lies on Pareto frontier by the incumbent’s electoral base. This bench-
mark is described by set of equations (9) and:
pθ(x, θ
I) = 1 for any x, (12)
when ∆ < 2b− 1;
pθ(x, θ
k) = 1 if and only if xθ = 0 (13)
when ∆  2b− 1, where θ takes either value in set BI(θI) (Lemma A.12).
Re-election pressures Recall that nomination rule is a majority vote,
and only a minimal majority of politicians are in the incumbent’s electoral
base. Therefore, nomination for re-election signals that all of them stayed on
the incumbent’s board. Instead, nomination failure signals that the incum-
bent’s policy reveals her type. Hence, a voter in the incumbent’s electoral
27In mirror image equilibria a politician votes for the incumbent’s nomination if and
only if she is against re-election.
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base votes for re-election, unless both he receives no pork and the incum-
bent is not nominated for re-election (Lemma A.14). Eventually, a voter
votes in the same way as a politician of his type. Hence, the incumbent is
re-elected if only if her pork-barrel policy does not reveal her type to the
politicians in her electoral base.28 Therefore, the incumbent picks: either (i)
her most preferred policy; or else (ii) the most efficient policy out of those
that any politician in her electoral base would implement under threat of
no re-election (Lemma A.15). The higher the cost of inefficient pork-barrel
policy, the higher the expected benefit from pandering to re-election, hence,
the more efficient the first-period policy.
The most efficient equilibrium without political collusion Sup-
pose that political faction formation is banned. Then, the expected benefit
from pandering to re-election is described by equation (6). When ∆  2b+1,
this benefit is sufficiently high to encourage the incumbent to implement pol-
icy
pθI (x, θ
I) = 0, pBI(θI )\{θI}(x, θ
I) = 1, p{1,2,3}\{BI(θI )}(x, θ
I) = 1 (14)
when xθI = 1, xBI (θI)\{θI} = 0 at a threat of no re-election. Therefore, the
first-period policy in the most efficient equilibrium with informative electoral
promises is described by equations (9) and (13). When ∆ < 2b + 1, re-
election pressures are too weak to induce the incumbent pick pork-barrel
policy that is descried by set of equations (14) when xθI = 1, xBI(θI)\{θI} =
0. Therefore, the first-period policy in the most efficient equilibrium with
informative electoral promises is egalitarian with respect to the citizens in
the incumbent’s electoral base: in region 2b− 1
2
< ∆ < 2b+1, they all receive
pork if and only if it is efficient, that is,
pθ(x, θ
I) = 1 if and only if xθ = 0 for either θ ∈ BI(θ
I); (15)
in region 2b− 1 < ∆  2b − 1
2
, they all receive pork, unless it is efficient to
give no pork to any of them, that is,
pθ(x, θ
I) = 0 if and only if xθ = 1 for any θ ∈ BI(θ
I); (16)
28Because nomination is influential, a politician is indeed eager to vote for the incum-
bent’s nomination if and only if she is for re-election.
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in region ∆  2b − 1 they all receive pork in any state (recall Lemma A.12
and Proposition 1).
Proposition 3 When political faction formation is banned, the first-period
policy in the most efficient equilibrium with informative electoral promises
is described by set of equations (9) and: (13) when ∆  2b + 1; (15) when
2b− 1
2
< ∆ < 2b+1; (16) when 2b− 1 < ∆  2b− 1
2
; (12) when ∆  2b− 1.
The incumbent is re-elected. In the second period, only type θI citizens receive
pork in any state.
Note that nomination for re-election increases the efficiency of pork-barrel
policy the more the higher the cost of inefficient pork-barrel pandering: com-
pare the first-period policy described by Proposition 1 to that described by
Proposition 3.
The most efficient equilibrium with political collusion Let us
now describe the most efficient equilibriumwith informative electoral promises
and political collusion. Political faction formation is the same as described
in Section 5. Hence, the incumbent’s benefit from pandering to re-election
is described by equation (10). Re-election pressures are weaker than in the
environment in which any politician is independent: compare equations (6)
and (10). Therefore, the first-period policy in the most efficient equilibrium
with informative electoral promises is less efficient.
Proposition 4 In the most efficient equilibrium with informative electoral
promises and political collusion the first-period policy is described by set of
equations (9) and: (13) when ∆  4b+2; (15) when 4b−2  ∆ < 4b+2, (5)
and (7) when 4b−2
3
< ∆ < 4b − 2; and (12) when ∆  4b−2
3
. The incumbent
is re-elected unless both 4b−2
3
 ∆ < 4b− 2 and xBI(θI)\{θI} = 1. The second-
period office-holder is a member of the faction. She gives pork only to her
type citizens in any state.
7 Conclusion
This paper builds a political agency model with nonbinding campaign promises.
Two main insights are: (i) a candidate’s campaign promises signal her po-
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litical preferences and public policy that she intends to implement; and (ii)
the politicians form factions to coordinate their electoral strategies. Fur-
thermore, we emphasize two welfare effects: (i) campaign promises limit the
incumbent’s opportunities to pander to re-election, and therefor decrease the
efficiency of her policy; (ii) political faction formation dilutes re-election pres-
sures, and, consequently, decreases the efficiency of pork-barrel policy. Other
effects, such as electoral sorting and commitment benefits from party orga-
nization, and re-election pressures from inter-party competition lie outside
the scope of this paper. We hope that future research will analyze the com-
plementarity of these effects and our insights in providing a better picture of
electoral competition with campaign promises and political parties.
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A Appendix
A.1 “Babbling” equilibria
Equation (1) implies
Pr
(
θI = θ | pI(x, θI), pθ(x, θ
I) = 1
)
 Pr
(
θI = θ | pI(x, θI), pθ(x, θ
I) = 0
)
.
(17)
There are two possibilities: either inequality
Pr
(
θI = θ | pI(x, θI), pθ(x, θ
I) = 1
)

1
3
(18)
is met for any pI(x, θI), or it is violated for some pI(x, θI). This section
describes equilibria in which inequality (18) is met for any pI(x, θI).
Lemma A.1 (pork-barrel policy without re-election concerns) The
last period office-holder delivers pork only to her type citizens.
Proof. Recall equation (1).
Lemma A.2 (grateful vote) Type θ citizens vote for re-election if and only
if pθ(x, θ
I) = 1.
Proof. Lemma A.1 implies that at date 2, type θ citizens vote for the
candidate whose type is the most likely to be θ: by symmetry, the citizens of
the same type vote in the same way. Inequalities (18) and (17) imply that:
either (i) the vote is described by Lemma A.2, or (ii) it does not depend on
p(x, θI). However, the second alternative is out of equilibrium: indeed, if the
vote does not depend on p(x, θI), the incumbent delivers pork only to type
θI citizens; in this case, however, the vote is such as described by Lemma
A.2.
By Lemma A.2, and equation (1),
Lemma A.3 (pork to congruent citizens) pθI (x, θ
I) = 1 for any x.
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Lemma A.4 (pandering to re-election) When ∆  2b− 1
2
or else when
min
θ =θI
xθ = 0, pθ̂(x, θ
I) = 1 and p{1,2,3}\{θ,θI}(x, θ
I) = 0, where θ̂ is a random
draw from argmin
θ =θI
xθ. Otherwise, pθ(x, θI) = 0 for either θ = θI .
Proof. By Lemma A.2, the incumbent stays in office if and only if∣∣{θ | pθ(x, θI) = 1}∣∣ = 2.
By Lemma A.3, the cost of re-election is equal to 1
2
(
1 + ∆min
θ =θI
xθ
)
. The
incumbent panders to re-election if and only if29
1
2
(
1 + ∆min
θ =θI
xθ
)
 R, (19)
where R is given by equation (6). In region ∆  2b − 1
2
, inequality (19) is
fulfilled in any state x:
1
2
(
1 + ∆min
θ =θI
xθ
)

1 + ∆
2

2b
3
+
1
3
+
∆
6
.
Instead, in region ∆ > 2b− 1
2
, it is met if and only if min
θ =θI
xθ = 0:
1
2

2b
3
+
1
3
+
∆
6
<
1 + ∆
2
.
Lemma A.5 (diffuse promises and uninformed vote) vector pk(x, θk) does
not depend on θk. At date 1 a citizen votes at random.
Proof. By Lemmas A.1 - A.4, a citizen is indifferent between the candidates
for office at date 1. By assumption (T2), he votes at random. Hence, k =
I with probability 1
2
regardless of pk(x, θk). Inequality (18) is met for any
pI(x, θI) if and only if pk(x, θk) does not depend on θk.
29Inequality (19) is not strict due to tie-breaking assumption (T4).
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A.2 Proof of proposition 1
Lemma A.6 (citizen preferences regarding the incumbent’s type)
argmax
θI
{
EVθ
(
p(x, θI)
)
| θI
}
= θ: the expectations are taken at date 1.
Proof. Denote with
c =
1
2
+
∆
4
(20)
an average cost that is paid by one type citizens for pork to some other
type citizens. In any state, the incumbent can deliver pork only to type θI
citizens. Even if afterwards she is not re-elected, the expected second-period
payoff by type θI citizens lies at least as high as threshold 1
3
b − 2
3
c, because
the probability of event that the challenger’s type is θI is equal to 1
3
. By a
revealed preference argument, when θI = θ,
EVθ
(
p(x, θI)
)
 b+
1
3
b−
2
3
c =
4
3
b−
2
3
c; (21)
whereas when θI = θ,
EVθ
(
p(x, θI)
)
 −
1
2
+
1
3
b−
2
3
c. (22)
The right-hand-side of equation (22) lies below that of equation (21).
Lemma A.7 (date 1 vote) At date 1 type θ citizens vote for:
(i) candidate k, either when θ ∈ Bk(θk)\B−k(θ−k), or else when both θ ∈
Bk(θk)∩B−k(θ−k) and
∣∣Bk(θk)∣∣ < ∣∣B−k(θ−k)∣∣; (ii) either candidate with prob-
ability 1
2
, when both θ ∈ Bk(θk) ∩ B−k(θ−k) and
∣∣Bk(θk)∣∣ = ∣∣B−k(θ−k)∣∣; (iii)
candidate −k otherwise.30
Proof. Follows from Lemma A.6, equations (4), (3), and assumption (T2).
Lemma A.8 (cardinality of a candidate’s electoral base)
∣∣Bk(θk)∣∣ = 2.
Proof. Candidate k pursues lexicographic objectives. It is the most impor-
tant for her to maximize the probability of event k = I (Lemma A.6). Her
secondary objective is to maximize
∣∣Bk(θk)∣∣ so as to minimize the cost of
30We use standard notation
∣∣∣Bk(θk)∣∣∣ for cardinality of set Bk(θk).
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re-election if k = I.
Step 1 proves that regardless of p−k(x, θk) there exist pk(x, θk) such that∣∣Bk(θk)∣∣ = 2. By equations (3) and (4),
Pr
(
θk = θ | EVθ
(
pk(x, θk)
)
= EV
θ˜
(
pk(x, θk)
)
> EV{1,2,3}\{θ,θ˜}
(
pk(x, θk)
))
=
=Pr
(
θk = θ˜ | EVθ
(
pk(x, θk)
)
= EV
θ˜
(
pk(x, θk)
)
> EV{1,2,3}\{θ,θ˜}
(
pk(x, θk)
))
=
=
1
2
for any pair of types θ and θ̂.
Step 2 proves that in equilibrium,
∣∣Bk(θk)∣∣ = 1. Suppose that ∣∣Bk(θk)∣∣ = 1.
The best response by candidate −k is to promise the same expected payoff to
anybody, so that B−k(θ−k) = {1, 2, 3} and −k = I. Then, however, it is the
best for candidate k to change her campaigning strategy in such a way that∣∣Bk(θk)∣∣ = 2 so that k = I: step 1 has shown that this deviation is feasible.
Step 3 proves that in equilibrium,
∣∣Bk(θk)∣∣ = 3. Suppose that Bk(θk) =
{1, 2, 3}. The best response by candidate−k is to give such promises p−k(x, θ−k)
that
∣∣B−k(θ−k)∣∣ = 2, so that −k = I. Then, however, it is the best for can-
didate k to change her campaigning strategy to such that
∣∣Bk(θk)∣∣ = 2, so
that k = I with probability 1
2
.
Step 4 proves that in equilibrium,
∣∣Bk(θk)∣∣ = 2. Suppose that ∣∣Bk(θk)∣∣ = 2.
Then, it is the best for candidate −k to give such promises p−k(x, θ−k) that∣∣B−k(θ−k)∣∣ = 2 so that the probability of event −k = I is equal to 1
2
: other-
wise this probability is equal to 0 (see steps 2 and 3). Trivially, it is the best
for candidate k to keep giving such promises pk(x, θk) that
∣∣Bk(θk)∣∣ = 2.
Lemma A.9 (date 2 vote) At date 2, type θ voters vote for the incumbent
if and only if both θ ∈ BI(θI) and pθ(x, θ
I) = 1.
Proof. Trivially, Lemma A.1 continues to hold. Therefore, at date 2, type
θ voters would like to elect the candidate whose type is the most likely to be
θ. The challenger is any type with probability 1
3
. When θ /∈ BI(θI), type θ
voters vote for the challenger: by equation (4),
Pr
(
θI = θ | pI(x, θI), pθ(x, θ
I)
)
= 0 for either pθ(x, θ
I).
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When θ ∈ BI(θI), type θ voters vote for the incumbent if and only if
pθ(x, θ
I) = 1 (see the proof of Lemma A.2).
Lemma A.10 θk ∈ Bk(θk).
Proof. By Lemma A.9, the incumbent is re-elected if and only if∣∣{θ ∈ BI(θI) | pθ(x, θI) = 1}∣∣ = 2. (23)
By Lemma A.8, the cost of pork-barrel pandering to re-election is equal to∑
θ∈BI(θI )\{θI}
1+∆xθ
2
. Because candidate k would like to minimize the cost of
pandering to re-election if in office, vector pk(x, θk) is such that θk ∈ Bk(θk).
Lemma A.11 (the incumbent’s policy) The first-period policy is such as
described by Proposition 1.
Proof. By Lemmas A.8, A.10, and assumption (T1), set BI(θI) has two
elements: θI and a random draw from set {1, 2, 3} \
{
θI
}
. Equation (5) is
trivial. Equation (9) is met because the vote by type {1, 2, 3} \BI(θI) voters
does not depend on p{1,2,3}\BI(θI)(x, θ
I), and
∂V
θI (p(x,θ
I))
∂p
{1,2,3}\BI (θI )(x)
< 0.
It remains to prove equations (7) and (8). The incumbent stays in office if
and only if equation (23) is met. By Lemmas A.8 and A.10, pBI (θI)\{θI}(x, θ
I) =
1 if and only if
1 + ∆xBI (θI)\{θI}
2
 R, (24)
where R is given by equation (6). In region ∆  2b− 1
2
, inequality (24) is met
in any state x. In region ∆ > 2b− 1
2
, it is met if and only if xBI(θI)\{θI} = 0.
It is straightforward to see that there is a consistency among the strategies
described by Lemma A.1 and Lemmas A.7 - A.11.
A.3 Proof of proposition 2
Step 1 (collusion with informative communication). Suppose that
political leader who is drawn the first learns any politician’s type.
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Let: θL be her type; triplet s = (sθL, s θ̂, s{1,2,3}\{θL, θ̂}) be stationary faction
membership offer that is accepted by any receiver; θ̂ = argmax
θ =θL
sθ; Pθ be
the probability of event θI = θ when strategy s is played and campaign
advertising is optimal. Trivially,
∑
θ
Pθ = 1. (25)
By Lemma A.6, type θ politician maximizes Pθ. Because the leader can make
no offer at all,31
PθL >
1
3
PθL +
∑
θ =θL
1
3
Pθ. (26)
By definition of strategy s,32
Pθ >
1
3
PθL +
∑
θ =θL
1
3
Pθ for either θ = θ
L such that sθ > 0. (27)
Step 1.a Let us prove that
sθL > 0. (28)
Suppose not, that is, sθL = 0. In equilibrium with political party formation
sθ > 0 for some θ. Hence, s θ̂ > 0. It cannot be that s{1,2,3}\{θL, θ̂} = 0:
otherwise, a politician’s membership in the faction reveals that her type is
θ̂, hence, P
θ̂
= 0 which contradicts to inequality (27) for θ = θ̂. However,
s{1,2,3}\{θL, θ̂} > 0 is also impossible: by inequality (26),
2PθL >
∑
θ =θL
Pθ, (29)
however, summing up inequalities (27) for θ = θL we find
2PθL <
∑
θ =θL
Pθ. (30)
31The right-hand-side of inequality (26) is the leader’s expected payoff if the game goes
back to date 0.a.
32The right-hand-side of inequalities (27) is a politician’s expected payoff if she rejects
the first offer, no faction is formed, and the game goes back to date 0.a. Inequalities (27)
are strict by tie-breaking assumption (T6).
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Step 1.b Let us prove that
min
θ =θL
sθ = 0. (31)
Suppose the contrary, that is, sθ > 0 for either θ = θ
L. Adding PθL to each
side of inequality (30) we find
∑
θ
Pθ > 3PθL . (32)
By equation (25), the left-hand-side of inequality (32) is equal to 1. Hence,
PθL <
1
3
. By equation (25),
∑
θ =θL
Pθ >
2
3
. By inequality (29),
∑
θ =θL
Pθ <
2
3
.
This, is a contradiction.
Step 1.c Let us prove that
max
θ =θL
sθ > 0. (33)
Suppose the contrary, that is, sθ = 0 for either θ = θL. Then, a politician’s
membership in the faction reveals that her type is θL: recall inequality (28).
Hence, PθL = 0. This, contradicts to inequality (32).
Step 1.d (composition of political faction) By equation (31) and in-
equality (33),
s
θ̂
> 0, s{1,2,3}\{θL, θ̂} = 0. (34)
By equation (25) and inequality (27) for θ = θ̂
P
θ̂
>
1
3
. (35)
By Lemma A.6, any faction member has the same electoral fortunes if
she is drawn to run for office. Because the draw is random, Pθ is increasing
in sθ for either θ from set
{
θL, θ̂
}
. Hence, the leader maximizes sθL. Due to
inequality (35), she is constrained by inequality33
s
θ̂
>
1
2
sθL . (36)
33The probability of event that the candidate from the faction wins the first election is
at most 1.
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Hence, sθL = 1 and s θ̂ =
1
2
+ ε, where ε is an arbitrary small value. By
assumption (T5), θ̂ is a random draw from set {1, 2, 3} \
{
θ0
}
.
Step 2 (informative communication). Let m(θ) be date 0.b message by
type θ politician. When the leader’s beliefs are Pr (θ | m(θ) = m) = 1, type θ
politician does not want to deviate from strategy m(θ) = m, because at date
0.b she assigns probability 2
3
to the event that θ is in set
{
θL, θ̂
}
, regardless
of m(θ).
Step 3 (electoral promises and pork-barrel policy). By steps 1 and 2,
all type θL politicians and a minimal majority of type θ̂ politicians form the
faction. The candidate for office from the faction forms electoral base out
of types θL and θ̂ citizens, and she wins the election by their votes. Hence,
BI(θI) =
{
θL, θ̂
}
.
Suppose that the incumbent picks her most preferred policy that reveals
her type. If she runs for office, she looses the second election to the challenger
whose type is θI with probability less than 1
2
. If instead she abstains from
re-election, the second election is an open-seat, and the winner is a member
of her faction whose type is θI with probability higher than 1
2
. Hence, the in-
cumbent either picks her most preferred policy and abstains from re-election,
or she gives pork to anybody in her electoral base, runs for re-election, and
wins it. Her expected benefit from pandering to re-election r is given by
equation (10). Her policy is such as described by the proposition, because
1 + ∆
2
 r if and only if ∆ 
4b− 2
3
.
A.4 Proof of proposition 3
Lemmas A.1, A.6, A.7(i), A.8 and A.10 continue to hold.
Lemma A.12 (the most efficient policy benchmark) In region ∆ <
2b− 1, the first-period policy is at most as efficient as pork-barrel policy that
is described by equations (9) and (12). In region ∆  2b − 1, the first-
period policy is at most as efficient as pork-barrel policy that is described by
equations (9) and (13).
Proof. In our model the efficiency of an equilibrium is measured by the
efficiency of the first period policy in this equilibrium (recall Lemma A.1).
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Equation (9) is met in any equilibrium with informative electoral promises.
Hence, ∑
θ∈{1,2,3}
Vθ(p(x, θ
I)) =
∑
θ∈BI (θI)
Vθ(p(x, θ
I)). (37)
The right-hand-side of equation (37) is maximized by vector p(x, θI) that is
described by the Lemma.
By Lemma A.12 and Proposition 1,
Lemma A.13 In region ∆ < 2b− 1, pork-barrel policy in the most efficient
equilibrium with informative electoral promises is described by equations (9)
and (12).
Let us consider region ∆  2b− 1.
Lemma A.14 (convincing nomination) Type θ voters vote for the in-
cumbent if and only if both θ ∈ BI(θI) and max
{
pθ(x, θ
I), e
}
= 1.
Proof. By Lemmas A.8, A.10, and assumption (T1), set BI(θI) has two
elements: θI and a random draw from set {1, 2, 3} \
{
θI
}
.
Step 1. Type {1, 2, 3} \BI(θI) voters vote for the challenger, because by
equation (3), Pr
(
θI = {1, 2, 3} \BI(θI) | pI(x, θI), p(x, θI), x
)
= 0.
Step 2. When e = 1, the voters of either type in set BI(θI) vote for the in-
cumbent: recall Lemma A.8 and the fact that a politician in the incumbent’s
electoral base votes for re-election if and only if inequality (11) is met.
Step 3. When e = 0, Pr
(
θI = θ | p(x, θI)
)
= 0 for some θ in BI(θI). Hence,34
Pr
(
θI = θ | e = 0, θ ∈ BI(θI), pθ(x, θ
I) = 0
)
= 0,
Pr
(
θI = θ | e = 0, θ ∈ BI(θI), pθ(x, θ
I) = 1
)
= 1.
By Lemma A.14, the incumbent stays in office if and only if inequality
(11) is met for either θ ∈ BI(θI). Note that a politician is eager to play
nomination strategy that is described by inequality (11).
Lemma A.15 Let
P˜ =
{
p˜(x, θI) | Vθ(p˜(x, θ
I)) +R  b for either θ ∈ BI(θI)
}
(38)
34Recall the proof of Lemma A.2.
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In the most efficient equilibrium with informative electoral promises
p(x, θI) = argmax
p˜(x,θI)∈P˜
VθI (p˜(x, θ
I)) (39)
if set P˜ is not empty; otherwise,
in any state x, pθI (x, θ
I) = 1 and pθ(x, θ
I) = 0 for either θ = θI . (40)
Proof. If Vθ(p(x, θ
I)) +R < b for some θ ∈ BI(θI),
Pr
(
θI = θ | pI(x, θI), p(x, θI), x
)
= 0.
Step 1. If P˜ = {∅}, the incumbent cannot be re-elected, by inequality (11)
and Lemma A.14. Hence, vector p(x, θI) is descried by set of equations (40).
Step 2. Let P˜ = {∅}. Politician posteriors
Pr
(
θI = θ | p(x, θI) ∈ P˜ , θ ∈ BI(θI)
)
=Pr
(
θI = θ | θ ∈ BI(θI)
)
=
1
2
,
and strategy described by equation (39) are consistent with each other.
A pooling equilibrium described in step 2 is more efficient than a sepa-
rating equilibrium described in step 1:
b
2
−
1
2
−
∆
4
< 0 for any ∆  2b− 1. (41)
Lemma A.16 When xθI = xBI(θI)\{θI}, the first-period policy in the most
efficient equilibrium with informative electoral promises is described by set of
equations (9) and (13).
Proof. Consider vector p(x, θI) described by equations (9) and (13). When
xθI = xBI(θI)\{θI} = 0,
R+ Vθ(p(x, θ
I)) = R + b−
1
2
> b for either θ ∈ BI(θI). (42)
When xθI = xBI(θI)\{θI} = 1,
35
R+ Vθ(p(x, θ
I)) = R > b for either θ ∈ BI(θI). (43)
35Recall that we consider region ∆  2b − 1. Set of inequalities (43) is met for any
∆  2b− 2.
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By set of inequalities (42) and (43), p(x, θI) ∈ P˜. By Lemmas A.12 and
A.15, p(x, θI) is the first-period policy in the most efficient equilibrium with
informative electoral promises.
Lemma A.17 When xθI = xBI(θI)\{θI}, the first-period policy in the most
efficient equilibrium with informative electoral promises is described by set of
equations (9) and: (13) in region ∆  2b + 1; (15) in region 2b − 1
2
< ∆ <
2b+ 1; and (16) in region 2b− 1 < ∆  2b− 1
2
.
Proof. Recall, that we look at pure strategies. By Lemma A.6, either (i)
the first-period policy in the most efficient equilibrium is described by set of
equations (40), or (ii) it lies in the set of policies described by Lemma A.17:
it will become clear that the mirror image of pork-barrel policy described
by equations (9) and (13) lies out of the most efficient equilibrium with
informative electoral promises. For each policy described by Lemma A.17,
we find the region of parameter ∆ in which this policy lies in set P˜ .
Step 1 shows that pork-barrel policy p(x, θI) descried by equations (9) and
(13) lies in set P˜ if and only if ∆  2b + 1. Indeed, the incumbent is the
most eager to deviate from this policy to that described by set of equations
(40) when xθI = 1 and xBI(θI)\{θI} = 0. Hence,
min
θ∈BI (θI),x
R+ Vθ(p(x, θ
I)) = R −
1
2
. (44)
The right-hand-side of equation (44) lies at least as high as threshold b if and
only if ∆  2b+ 1.
Step 2 shows that pork-barrel policy p(x, θI) descried by equations (9) and
(15) lies in set P˜ if and only if ∆  2b − 2. Indeed, the incumbent is the
most eager to deviate from this policy to that described by set of equations
(40) when xθI = 1. Hence,
min
θ∈BI(θI),x
{
R+ Vθ(p(x, θ
I))
}
= R. (45)
The right-hand-side of equation (45) lies at least as high as threshold b if and
only if ∆  2b− 2.
Step 3 shows that pork-barrel policy p(x, θI) descried by equations (9) and
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(16) lies in set P˜ if and only if ∆  2b − 1
2
. Indeed, the incumbent is the
most eager to deviate from this policy to that described by set of equations
(40) when xBI(θI )\{θI} = 1. Hence,
min
θ∈BI (θI),x
{
R+ Vθ(p(x, θ
I))
}
= R+ b−
1 + ∆
2
. (46)
The right-hand-side of equation (46) lies at least as high as threshold b if and
only if ∆  2b− 1
2
.
Step 4 By steps 1-3 and Lemma A.15, the first-period policy that is the
mirror image of that described by equations (9) and (13) lies out of the most
efficient equilibrium with informative electoral promises. Indeed, it is less
efficient than any policy described in steps 1-3, and for any ∆ at least one
policy described in steps 1-3 lies in set P˜ .
Step 5 By step 1, and Lemmas A.12 and A.15: when ∆  2b + 1, the
first-period policy in the most efficient equilibrium with informative electoral
promises is described by equations (9) and (13).
Step 6 By steps 1-3 when 2b − 1
2
< ∆ < 2b + 1, set P˜ has one element: it
is described by equations (9) and (15). By Lemma A.15, this element is the
first-period policy in the most efficient equilibrium with informative electoral
promises.
Step 7 By steps 1-3 when 2b−1 < ∆  2b− 1
2
, there are two elements in set
P˜. The one that is described by equations (9) and (16) is the most efficient.
Indeed,
1
4
(
b−
1
2
)
+
(
b−
1 + ∆
2
)
> 0 if and only if ∆  4b− 2;
by assumption (2), 4b− 2 > 2b− 1
2
.
A.5 Proof of proposition 4
The proof is similar to that of proposition 3. Political faction formation is
described by Proposition 2. Therefore, the expected benefit from pandering
to re-election is described by equation (10).
Let P˜c =
{
p˜(x, θI) | Vθ(p˜(x, θ
I)) + r  b for either θ ∈ BI(θI)
}
. (47)
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In the most efficient equilibriumwith informative electoral promises p(x, θI) =
argmax
p˜(x,θI)∈P˜c
VθI (p˜(x, θ
I)), where if set P˜c is not empty; otherwise,
in any state x, pθI (x, θ
I) = 1 and pθ(x, θ
I) = 0 for either θ = θI : (48)
see the proof of Lemma A.15 and recall that the expected benefit from pan-
dering to re-election is given by equation (10).
In region ∆  4b+2, the first-period policy in the most efficient equilibrium
with informative electoral promises is described by equations (9) and (13):
min
θ∈BI(θI),x
{
r + Vθ(p(x, θ
I))
}
= r −
1
2
 b if and only if ∆  4b+ 2.
In region 4b − 2  ∆ < 4b + 2, the first-period policy in the most efficient
equilibrium with informative electoral promises is described by equations (9)
and (15):
min
θ∈BI (θI),x
{
r + Vθ(p(x, θ
I))
}
= r  b if and only if ∆  4b− 2.
Policy described by equations (9) and (16) lies out of the most efficient equi-
librium with informative electoral promises. Indeed,
min
θ∈BI(θI ),x
{
r + Vθ(p(x, θ
I))
}
= r + b−
1 + ∆
2
 b if and only if ∆ 
4b− 2
3
.
However, when ∆  4b−2
3
, the first period policy in the most efficient equilib-
rium is described by equations (9) and (12), by Lemma A.12 and Proposition
2: 4b−2
3
< 2b− 1.
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